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ABSTRACT 
 
In the early 1900s, Argentina witnessed the emergence of the labor 
movement, whose eventual incorporation transformed the political landscape. By 
the end of the century, another watershed event, neoliberal reform, resulted in the 
emergence of a new social actor: piqueteros. This study outlines the parallels 
between the origins of the two movements and examines piqueteros’ use of 
roadblocks, identity formation, linkage to the Peronist party, and relation with 
labor.  
This project contributes primary data gathered through interviews with 
individuals close to the movement and conducts theoretically grounded analyses of 
secondary data. Piqueteros and organized labor are found to adhere to the same 
historical pattern of emergence and incorporation. The logic of roadblocks is 
traced to functional similarities to strikes and access to non-material benefits. 
These non-material benefits, in turn, became identity forming elements at very 
local levels in homogeneous communities. The organizational structure of these 
piquetero groups, coupled Kirchner’s need for political support led to clientelistic 
	   vi	  
linkages. Lastly, the experience of labor unions and piquetero groups within an 
umbrella organization point to a rather collaborative relationship and suggest that 
inter-movement ties can be stronger than intra-movement ones. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Labor incorporation was a critical element in the development of politics 
in Latin America. By the second half of the 20th century the social question had 
largely been addressed in most of the continent, and countries had embarked in 
the path dependent journey that generally follows watershed political events. 
However, in recent years a modified version of the social question resurfaced. 
The 1980s debt crisis and its aftermath, neoliberal reform, resulted in a large 
number of unemployed and informally employed people. This sector fell outside 
the established labor-state terms of engagement; a new incorporation process 
seemed pertinent.  
However, the unemployed only coalesced as a coherent movement in 
Argentina. There, they came to be known as piqueteros: victims of the neoliberal 
economic model, organized and politically active. As had been the case with 
organized labor, the emergence of piqueteros as a new social actor proved to be a 
transformative political experience. Piqueteros revolutionized social protest, 
catapulted the Kirchners to hegemony over Peronism, and facilitated the 
adaptive transformation of the Partido Justicialista. Accordingly, the movement’s 
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relation to these changes, as well as its inherent characteristics, warrant careful 
academic attention.  
Many scholars have risen to that challenge. For example, Benclowicz 
(2010), Alcañiz and Scheier (2007), and Epstein (2009) trace the peculiarities of 
particular piquetero groups. Medina (2010) more generally analyzes the 
piqueteros’ struggle to achieve visibility within the neoliberal order, and Rojas 
(2014) surveys the social conditions of Cristina Fern{ndez de Kirchner’s 
Argentina to underscore the precarious conditions fueling protest from the 
popular classes. Svampa and Pereyra (2009) compile the piquetero’s historical 
origins, highlighting spontaneous, grassroots organization, and outlining the 
transition from isolated groups to a movement. Nonetheless, several questions 
remain unanswered or underdeveloped.  
Among the pending matters to be resolved in relation to the piquetero 
movement are its incorporation process, its relation to labor, and the reasons 
behind its use of roadblocks as a form of protest. Further, the literature has failed 
to develop a model to analyze the emergence of piqueteros and systematically 
compare it to the trajectory of other social movements such as organized labor. 
The failure to submit the data on piqueteros to established theoretical 
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frameworks has created a number of ambiguities, unexplained phenomena, and 
misconceptions. 
This paper aims to remedy these shortcomings. It does so by presenting 
the history and principal features of the movement within a solidly grounded 
theoretical framework that highlights the parallels and areas of convergence 
between piqueteros and organized labor. In the process, I answer the following 
questions: What process and conditions gave rise to the labor and piquetero 
movements respectively, and how do those compare? How and why were 
piqueteros incorporated? Why do piqueteros engage in roadblocks specifically as 
their main form of protest? How was the piquetero identity consolidated, given 
the heterogeneity of the informal sector? What is the nature of the relation 
between labor and piqueteros?  
Accordingly, I start by tracing the histories of the labor and piquetero 
movements, first individually and then side by side to underscore similarities. I 
frame the movements’ historical trajectories in a model in which a change in the 
economic model triggers social conditions that give rise to a new class, which 
suffers state repression, and is finally incorporated with no small use of 
cooptation techniques.  
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Next, I focus on the features of the piquetero movement and make 
connections, whenever possible, to the labor movement. The use of roadblocks is 
analyzed taking into account the influence of labor unions and their protest 
techniques, as well as the incentives and disincentives that would motivate a 
rational actor to engage in that sort of collective activity. Closely related, a 
discussion follows regarding the formation of piquetero identity, the role of 
protest and group identity-forming elements.  
Then, I turn to the linkages between the PJ and piqueteros to distinguish 
between programmatic and clientelistic relations. I consider the interests of 
Kirchner in incorporating piqueteros as well as the internal organization of 
piqueteros and the role of piquetero leaders as intermediaries between the party 
and the group members.  
Lastly, I broach the subject of piquetero and labor relations, considering 
the experiences of piqueteros under an umbrella organization comprising groups 
from both movements. 
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METHODS 
 In the first section, I develop a historical model based on a pattern to 
which both piqueteros and labor conform to compare the movements from origin 
to incorporation. In the second part, I perform a review of the relevant literature 
and fit it to the relevant theoretical model to achieve a more focused analysis. I 
also rely on primary and secondary data to enrich those discussions and 
contribute to the body of knowledge on the topic. Primary data was collected 
through interviews with leaders and members of piquetero groups and other 
relevant figures. The interviews were conducted during a two week field 
research trip to Buenos Aires in January 2014. The interviews were conducted in 
Spanish and any text reproduced here has been translated by me. Additionally, I 
will not identify the interview subjects by name to protect their identity, as we 
agreed that any comments reproduced in this paper would remain unattributed. 
Occasionally, I also draw on secondary data to create charts. Particularly, I use 
data from Nueva Mayoría, a sociopolitical research center, and figures published 
in Ponce (2007).  
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HISTORICAL TRAJECTORIES 
Brief History Of The Labor Movement 
The first signs of industrialization in Argentina came in the last decades of 
the 19th century, but did not consolidate until well into the 1930s. Demographic 
factors, internal political pressures, and external economic influence shaped the 
country’s delayed manufacturing evolution. An analysis of the pre-1930s nascent 
Argentine industry solves an apparent paradox whereby an organized working 
class, capable of collective action had emerged before the ubiquity of factories in 
the country. Although the early process of industrialization proved economically 
negligible, it did produce a remarkable social imprint in the form of the working 
class. 
The demographic makeup of the country presented a challenge to early 
industrialization. Argentina was sparsely inhabited throughout the 1800s; by 
1875, the national population stood at just over two million (Rocchi 2006, 18). 
Scientist Ricardo Napp explained the economic impact of this figure at the time: 
‚No industry can prosper in a country with only one inhabitant for each two 
square kilometers, where the labor force is very expensive and there is no capital 
and technological knowledge‛ (qtd. in Rocchi 2006, 17).  Low population 
signified an insufficient source of labor force, as well as a meager domestic 
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market for manufactured products. Lacking the means to create cost-effective 
supply and the necessary demand, Argentine industry had remained unviable.  
However, national policy guided by the principle of ‚gobernar es poblar‛ 
(to govern is to populate) attracted a large number of European immigrants and 
ignited industrialization. Juan Bautista Alberdi, intellectual author of the 1853 
National Constitution and author of the phrase explained its meaning:  
To govern is to populate in the sense that to populate is to educate, 
improve, civilize, enrich and enlarge< but to civilize the population, it is 
necessary to populate with civilized populations; to educate our America 
in liberty and industry it is necessary to populate it with the populations 
of Europe most advanced in liberty and industry1 (2003, 16). 
Politicians adhered to this philosophy and successfully promoted European 
immigration. Working class immigrants swarmed in attracted by the wages in 
Buenos Aires, which by 1914 surpassed those of Paris and Marseille in some 
professions (Collier and Collier 1991, 60). As a result, Argentina gained the 
human capital necessary for development through the immigrants’ numbers, 
                                                          
1 My translation; original Spanish text: Gobernar es poblar en el sentido que poblar es educar, 
mejorar, civilizar, enriquecer y engrandecer< pero para civilizar por la población es preciso 
poblar con poblaciones civilizadas; para educar a nuestra América en la libertad y en la industria 
es preciso poblarla con las poblaciones de la Europa más adelantada en libertad y en industria.  
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knowledge and skills. Additionally, the increase in population also strengthened 
the domestic market for Argentine products. By 1930, the country counted with 
over 12 million people (Rocchi 2006, 18). Then, a reshuffling of demographics 
favored industry again: rural to urban migration provided another large influx of 
industrial workers boosting their number from 467,000 in 1935 to 844,000 in 1943 
(McGuire 1995, 208). The increase in population allowed for (an equally gradual) 
move toward industrialization.  
 A further obstacle to industrial development came from the economically 
and politically dominant landed elite. The Partido Autonomista Nacional (PAN), 
Argentina’s first major political party, in power from 1880 to 1909, was a simply 
the ‚electoral vehicle of the landowners of the Pampas region‛ (McGuire 1995, 
203). After 1909, the PAN split into regional parties, which remained beholden to 
local landowning elites (204). During this period, many politicians and all 
presidents were from land-owning families; and when in 1916, the executive 
power went to the middle class Radical Civic Union party, landowners’ retained 
state power through control of the senate and positions in executive departments 
(Friedman 1989, 5). Moreover, at this point the Argentine middle class was not 
entrepreneurial, instead it depended on the export economy and so the new 
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government sought to preserve this model rather than cater to industrial 
interests (20).  
The agro-export elite pursued economic policies that benefitted rural 
interests at the expense of industry. Free trade fomented the sale of Argentine 
beef, grain, and wool abroad, but also facilitated the import of manufactured 
products with which national industry struggled to compete. ‚Industrial 
protection and economic nationalism were time and time again sacrificed. 
Domestic manufacture seldom received an adequate stimulus‛ (Corradi 1985, 
22). Governmental neglect of industry delayed this form of economic 
development. For instance, tariff policy was largely to generate revenue rather 
than to protect industry. One of the first records of the protectionist vs. free trade 
debate comes from the year 1953, when the legislature was considering the 
replacement of an earlier tariff law on the grounds of revenue production only 
without protectionist intent (Panettieri 1983, 7). Further, in the cases when 
protectionism was the aim of a tariff, the protection usually went to agro/pastoral 
sectors (Friedman 1989, 26). It was not until 1923, under the leadership of 
President Alvear, that industry received a substantially beneficial tariff 
(Villanueva 1972, 465). During this period, internal political pressures generally 
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disregarded the interests of the industrial class, favoring the export model 
instead.  
A third reason that contributed to the slow development of Argentine 
industry is the mechanics of the world market, to which the country was fairly 
integrated by the late 19th century. High demand for raw materials from more 
industrialized countries made exports a lucrative enterprise and discouraged 
divestment of resources for manufacture. To industrialize, Argentina would have 
had to abandon the traditional export model that had brought about the 
country’s first economic bonanza. Thus, a late start on industrialization served as 
a self-perpetuating force delaying the process. Further, Argentina had little 
control over its role in this system of trade: its five main trading partners before 
the First World War, Great Britain, France, Germany, Italy, and the United States, 
accounted for half the country’s exports and one fourth of its imports while 
Argentina represented only 2.5 percent of their trade (Randall 1978, 214). 
International influence, thus, limited the country’s ability to charter a new road 
based on a different economic model.  
Foreign investment also factors in as a relevant molder of Argentine 
industrialization. Reliance on funds from abroad for nation-building projects 
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bound the country to the international market. ‚Saddled with vast foreign 
investment, Argentina was obliged to export or go bankrupt, and this meant 
concentration upon a limited range of exportable staple products with all the 
social, political, moral and intellectual consequences of acute dependency‛ 
(Corradi 1985, 24). Although most of this investment favored export and import 
trade (Peralta-Ramos 1992, 17), some of it did go towards industry. Indeed, by 
1935 over 50 percent of industry belonged to foreigners (21). However, some 
foreign owned companies functioned more as importers of finished products 
than as industrial manufacturers, benefitting the parent firm more than the 
Argentine branch (Villanueva 1972, 465).  
Argentine industrialization was both hindered and shaped by elements 
related to population, the internal distribution of political power, and external 
pressures emanating from the world market and foreign capital. In turn, these 
factors also mediated the emergence of the working class. The growth in 
population through European immigration ‚had a major impact on the 
emergence of national labor movements< the direct experience of many 
immigrants with labor movements in Europe played a central role in shaping 
labor movement development‛ (Collier and Collier 1991, 65). As it turned out, 
policies guided by Alberti’s maxim not only populated Argentina with those 
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knowledgeable of industry, but also of labor unions and working class struggles. 
The internal distribution of political power also contributed to the emergence of 
a strong labor movement. The PAN’s landed elite and the Radical’s middle class, 
owing their condition to the export model rather than manufacture, had no 
particular interest in curtailing labor unionization. In the absence of a systematic 
negative state policy towards labor, the movement grew and strengthened, even 
achieving national organization through the founding of the Confederación 
General del Trabajo (CGT) in 1930 (Kenworthy 1972, 467). Lastly, foreign capital 
also facilitated the rise of the working class. Due to the immigrant status of early 
industrial company owners, they wielded very little political influence (467). 
Indeed, the early immigrant industrial sector was nonpolitical: they were 
motivated by profit, which did not require an Argentine citizenship (Corradi 
1985, 33). Foreign-born Argentineans, who often did not become citizens, 
avoided not only the mandatory military service but also lacked suffrage and the 
political capital necessary to counter the worker movement (Randall 1978,119). In 
addition, foreign capitalists fueled disgruntled workers’ grievances by adding a 
component of nationalism to their struggle (Collier and Collier 1991, 64). The 
industrialists’ political weakness, owing to their foreign origin, permitted the 
consolidation of the worker’s movement.  
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Thus, although pre-1930’s industrial development in Argentina was 
relatively meek in economic terms, the particularities of the process, which began 
as early as 1880, allowed for a significant social impact in the form of the rise of 
the working class. Additional characteristics relevant to the formation of labor 
movements in Latin America in general were also present in the Argentine case. 
Urbanization, grievances regarding work conditions, the concentration of 
production in large factories located in isolated enclaves contributed to favorable 
conditions for unionization and working class identity formation (Levitsky 2003, 
38; Collier and Collier 1991, 63). However, the rise of the working class and its 
success as a social actor should not be conflated. Indeed, the early stages of the 
movement were rather unsatisfactory. 
Prior to its incorporation in the 1940s, the labor movement faced harsh 
state repression and the inability to materialize its goals. The conservative 
government’s response to the country’s first general strike in 1902 was the 
enactment of the Ley de Residencia (Residency Law) allowing for the deportation 
of any foreigner who compromises national security or public order. Clashes 
between workers and the police in 1904 and 1909 left several dead and many 
more injured. In 1910, a political assassination prompted a state of siege, the 
closure of union locales, curtailment of the right to assembly, and a wave of 
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deportations (McGuire 1997, 36; Corradi 1985, 34). An apparent change came in 
the 1917-1919 period, when President Yrigoyen made a number of overtures to 
labor. In an effort to consolidate popular support for the Radicals, Yrigoyen 
sporadically intervened on some strikes, favoring unions. However, conservative 
backlash quickly set the government back on its repressive track (Epstein 7). One 
of the culminating points of the state’s violent efforts to suppress collective action 
by labor movements was the Semana Trágica (Tragic Week) of 1919, when a strike 
by metal workers was met with violence from middle- and upper-class civilians 
recruited by Radical Party committees and organized by navy officers and the 
police (McGuire 1997, 40). The formation of the Liga Patriótica Argentina 
(Argentine Patriotic League), staffed by navy officers and whose main activities 
involved the repression of strikes further exemplifies this trend. The national 
army was also used as a tool of repression; between 1921 and 1922 it was 
responsible for the massacre of over 1000 workers (41). Systematic repression 
was part of the obstacles labor movements faced in the pre-incorporation period.  
A second impediment to workers was the inability to achieve their goals. 
Unions lacked institutional channels through which to negotiate their interests; 
the working class lacked any organization that would have allowed it to win a 
voice in political decision-making (Peralta-Ramos 1992, 26). Through strikes, 
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workers could expect violence and an astoundingly low success rate. Indeed, 
‚with the exception of a 1935 strike< the majority of the strikes of the decade 
failed to achieve their objectives‛ (24). The infamous decade of the 1930s, marked 
by military rule, led to a number of anti-labor policies that included the fall of 
real wages, mass firing of government employees and overall worsening social 
indicators (Randall 1978, 132). Violently repressed and unable to channel its 
demands through political institutions, labor fared poorly in this period. 
This changed in the 1940s and 50s, when the movement underwent 
incorporation at the hands of Perón. According to Collier and Collier, ‚the period 
of initial incorporation of the labor movement is defined as the first sustained 
and at least partially successful attempt by the state to legitimate and shape an 
institutionalized labor movement‛ (1991, 162). This included phasing out the 
state policy of repression and granting some of the movement’s demands for 
benefits and improved conditions. However, it did not lead to an 
institutionalized role for labor within the party; rather, Perón tied the 
movement’s gains and status to its relationship with him, establishing a 
symbiotic relationship where benefits were exchanged for political support.  
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Starting in 1943, when he rose to the position of secretary of labor, Perón 
initiated a sustained approach to workers’ organizations. He met with union 
leaders, even getting some of them out of jail, ended the assault on the 
movement, and helped organize the descamisados, workers newly arrived to 
Buenos Aires from the countryside (Corradi 1985, 58). Accustomed to 
crackdowns, marginalization, and denials, workers responded extremely well to 
Perón. ‚When Perón began clandestine overtures to unions in August and 
September [of 1943], he encountered a highly organized bargaining partner 
desperate for maneuvering room‛ (Alderman 1992, 247). The union’s valuable 
bargaining chip was, of course, mass popular support. This became manifest 
after Perón’s arrest in 1945 when workers took over the city of Buenos Aires and 
the CGT declared a general strike in support of their benefactor, resulting in his 
release. Perón formed the Partido Laborista (Labor Party) as a mobilization vehicle 
to win the presidency in 1946. As president, he continued his favorable policies 
towards the working class, elevating employment and wages and granting the 
rights to an eight hour workday, unemployment compensation, a Christmas 
bonus, and paid vacation (Peralta-Ramos 1992, 31). Such was the impact of 
Perón’s policies that he presided over the ‚largest redistribution of income in the 
history of the republic‛ (Pion-Berlin 1989, 65).  
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Perón was personally responsible for the vast improvement experienced 
by the working class through incorporation. By opportunistically rallying the 
previously untapped support of unions and labor in general, Perón secured his 
main political victories. Nevertheless, the benefits handed out were a means to 
an end and so cooption soon followed. The Partido Laborista was absorbed by the 
Peronist Party (the Partido Justicialista) in 1947, the CGT became dependent on 
the leader, and unions’ political power remained informal (McGuire 1995, 210). 
The union leaders who resisted the party merger, fearing subordination and loss 
of independence, were promptly jailed (Corradi 1985, 67). Perón concentrated 
power in his hands and kept his namesake party weakly institutionalized 
(Mainwaring and Scully 1995, 19), securing his personal dominance over the 
sectors that composed it. Labor derived its newly acquired status from Perón, but 
remained beholden to him according to the terms of their bargaining relation.  
Brief History Of the Piquetero Movement 
 The Import Substitution Industrialization model, on which Argentina had 
embarked as the manufacturing sector gradually developed, was undone by 
neoliberal reform in the 1990s. This economic shift resulted in a dramatic 
expansion of the informal sector along with a number of social conditions that 
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enabled the emergence of piqueteros, a new social actor, vis–à–vis the decline of 
organized labor.  
 Modernization exerted a number of pressures on the Argentine state 
resulting on steep inflation. Notably, urban population increase, a trend already 
under way at the turn of the century, continued as the decades advanced. By 
1950, 64 percent of the country’s inhabitants lived in urban centers.  In 1965 the 
figure had escalated to 76 percent, and in 1987 it reached 85 percent. Public 
expenditures increased in response to the need for sanitation, services provision 
and supply, and other urban infrastructure. The growing industry sector also 
required improved infrastructure, which the state financed through budget 
deficits and tax concessions designed to attract private capital. Essentially, 
increased spending coupled with reduced revenues paved the path for inflation. 
Lastly, price controls –of food and public utility to benefit working class urban 
dwellers; of raw materials to benefit manufacturers—resulted in shortages, 
which in turn led to elevated prices and state subsidies (Baer 1991, 46-48). The 
government’s failure to broker a compromise between the competing interests of 
the economic classes plunged the country into financial instability.   
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The aforementioned economic climate would only worsen with the 
progression of the following two decades. The oil shocks of the 1970s 
exacerbated the troubled economy as higher energy costs were passed along the 
economy. Meanwhile, foreign debt had been accumulating and the government, 
facing opposition to tax hikes and budget cuts from both labor and business, 
resorted to printing money to pay its dues (Baer 1991, 51; Manzetti 2009, 144). A 
number of heterodox programs, which combine fiscal and monetary austerity as 
orthodox elements with unorthodox price and wage freezes, were implemented 
in subsequent attempts to stabilize the economy (Beckerman 66). The failure of 
these plans prompted the International Monetary Fund (IMF) to withdraw 
assistance to Argentina in 1988 (Manzetti 2009, 145). The Import Substitution 
Industrialization (ISI) model, whereby the state provided protectionist policies to 
encourage the domestic manufacture of items which had previously been 
imported, had run out of steam and no stabilization program could reignite it.  
 The country needed decisive, radical action  to address its economic 
woes; or so thought Carlos Menem upon his election to the presidency in 1989.  
Having campaigned on a platform promising increased government spending, 
rejection of structural reform, and job creation, Menem pursued diametrically 
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opposed policies while in office (Manzetti 2009, 144; Drake 1996, 179).  Namely, 
he sought to replace ISI model with a neoliberal model.  
In this context, the term neoliberalism is used as suggested by Boas and 
Gans-Morse, ‚to distinguish between the radical forms of market economies 
emerging in the developing world and the traditional liberal market economies 
of North America and Western Europe‛ (2009, 157). This radicalism is rooted in 
the fact that the emerging economies embraced the policies that traditional 
liberal countries and institutions advocated but did not necessarily subscribe to.  
External pressures from advanced economies were one of the key factors 
for the spread of neoliberalism in Latin America. For instance, the political and 
technocratic bodies in Washington insisted on prudent macroeconomic policies, 
outward orientation and free market capitalism, which collectively came to be 
known as the Washington Consensus (WC). The WC was actively promoted 
abroad, even if the United States subscribed only to a select number of these 
principles rather than the complete package (Williamson 1990, 18). Another set of 
incentives relevant for Latin American countries but not for more advanced 
economies relate to the conditionality of IMF and World Bank assistance. These 
institutions extended loans only on the condition that the recipient country 
adopted a number of reforms regarding trade, privatizations, and financial 
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liberalization (Edwards 1995, 57). Ultimately, the developing world was 
encouraged to carry out a liberalization plan that exceeded the model in place in 
traditional liberal market countries. In the case of Argentina, Menem was 
particularly receptive to these external pressures; his steadfast adherence to 
neoliberal policies made him a poster child of the WC and earned him the praise 
of the IMF (Manzetti 2009, 147).  
Given the radical nature of these policies, it is striking that Menem 
managed to implement them in the first place. Three main factors permitted the 
shift of Argentina’s economic model in the 1990s. First, the dire economic 
condition of the country and the failure of more modest heterodox programs 
provided a favorable domestic environment for reform. Second, the WC lent 
external validation and incentives for the implementation of a neoliberal agenda. 
And third, the political weakness of labor unions translated to their inability to 
oppose Menem’s changes. Unions had been affected by a decline in membership, 
the government’s delay in the restoration of full labor rights, and competition 
with the Partido Justicialista for control of Peronism (Drake 1996, 176-178). 
Together, these factors allowed for the adoption of the Convertibility Plan in 
1991, the main vehicle for the neoliberal agenda in Argentina. 
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Through the Convertibility Plan, Menem’s administration pursued a more 
flexible labor market where wages were tied to productivity, collective 
bargaining restricted to specific sectors and decentralized to the company level, 
and social security contributions reduced or waived (Novick, Lengyel, and 
Sarabia 2009, 239). Further, Menem ‚implemented the most radical privatization 
program in Latin America, slashed public employment and government 
spending, and opened many economic sectors to foreign competition‛ (Manzetti 
2009, 146). The social effect of these policies was profound. The adjustments to 
the labor market further undermined unions and jeopardized workers’ rights. 
Newly privatized enterprises laid off a large number of workers and paid lower 
wages. The reduction of the public sector led to increased levels of 
unemployment, lesser spending weakened the welfare state, and foreign 
competition starved off medium and small domestic businesses.  
Of these reforms, the privatization program warrants particularly close 
attention given its important socioeconomic implications. Since the state owned 
mostly natural monopolies, the privatization of state-owned companies shook up 
entire industries. The total number of enterprises privatized was small but the 
companies themselves were large and represented a sizable sector. In economic 
terms, these firms generally fared better after privatization, reporting increases in 
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productivity, output, and revenue. Socially, the picture was bleaker. 
Privatizations translated to a society of displaced workers, which refers to 
‚persons permanently separated from their jobs and connotes the disappearance 
of the job as well as the dislocation of the individual workers from the 
enterprise‛ (Evans-Klock, Richards and Vargha 1998, 21).  A study by the Inter-
American Development Bank revealed that employment decreased 
approximately 40 percent as a result of privatization in Argentina (Fig. 1), and 
that laid-off workers experienced more unemployment than non-displaced 
workers. This dynamic resulted in the emergence of the unemployed as the 
victims of the privatization program.  
 
Figure 1 Unemployment rate in Argentina, 1990-2003. 
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The difficulty of these displaced workers was twofold. First, because they 
had been employed by monopolistic companies, their industry specific skills 
were not easily transferrable to other fields. For example, displaced workers 
received severance pay at the end of their employment and many used the 
money to establish their own businesses. However, they lacked the 
entrepreneurial skills necessary for success and most ventures failed within a 
year (Svampa and Pereyra 2009, 111). A second hurdle unemployed people faced 
was a lack of advocacy. In this period, unions struggled just to limit the loss of 
workers’ rights; they were in no condition to champion the interests of the 
unemployed. Thus, a large number of people found themselves, unemployed, 
unable to find new jobs, and without an organization to represent their interests.  
On the aggregate, Menem’s policies significantly changed the economic 
landscape of Argentina and resulted in a number of social conditions that set the 
state for the rise of piqueteros. A report by the International Labor Office 
summarizes the effects of neoliberal reform: 
The effects of globalization and macroeconomic factors on the labor 
market during the 1990s were that: (i) greater flexibility reduced the 
proportion of workers with permanent contracts and job security and 
increased the proportion with temporary contracts or no contracts at all; 
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(ii) trade union coverage was reduced in many countries; (iii) high rates of 
inflation in some countries greatly reduced the real value of the minimum 
wage in comparison to its value in 1980; and (iv) underemployment was 
very high in many Latin American countries (Thomas 2002). 
A brief case study of the privatization of Yacimientos Petrolíferos Fiscales 
(YPF) showcases the processes outlined above. YPF was a vertically integrated 
oil producer with a monopoly in the sector. Beyond oil production, YPF also 
provided a combination of material and social benefits to its thousands of 
employees in regions of Neuquén and Salta in the form of social, recreational, 
and residential services (Svampa and Pereyra 2009, 105). It symbolized the passé 
role of the interventionist, protectionist, welfare state that Menem intended to 
reform. Menem’s administration hoped to make the YPF more effective and 
internationally competitive through privatization. By the time the YPF’s sale had 
been finalized in 1993, the decision proved an economic success and a social 
disaster.  
According to World Bank estimates, ‚YPF’s privatization generated $5.1 
billion in cash and incurred $13.5 million in costs‛(Welch and Mond 1998, 21). 
However, it also resulted in a reduction of the number of employees from 51,000 
26 
 
 
in 1990 to 8,000 in 1993. The 43,000 laid-off workers lost not only their income, 
but also the extensive benefits associated with government employment. When 
they tried to mobilize, they found that the union had ‚literally evaporated‛ and 
the traditional conflict resolution and mediation channels were no longer 
available (Svampa and Pereyra 2009, 112). On June 20th, 1996, a group of 20,000 
marched out in the town of Cultural-Co and blocked national route 22 to 
pressure the political and economic leaders of the region to intercede in their 
favor. The foundations of the piquetero movement had been laid. 
The experience of former YPF workers was repeated time and time again 
through the country. From Cultural-Co, Neuquén, the protests and roadblocks 
expanded to General Mosconi, Salta, another YPF oil town. Gradually, they 
spread throughout the provinces, eventually reaching Greater Buenos Aires and 
the federal capital. In small industrial towns, suburbs, and cities, hordes of 
displaced workers were joined by the retired, affected by the disintegration of 
the welfare state. They, in turn, were joined by those in the precarious, unstable 
informal sector, ranging from construction workers to domestic servants (Portes 
and Hoffman 2003). Lastly, lower class communities also joined to protest 
against increased prices for privatized public services. This heterogeneous group, 
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sharing little more than a number of grievances emanating from or worsened by 
neoliberal reforms, came to be known as piqueteros.  
Despite internal differences, piquetero groups have displayed a striking 
level of organization, as exemplified by a number of successfully run national 
assemblies in the early 2000s. The First National Piquetero Assembly convened 
on July 24th, 2001to coordinate goals and strategies. This assembly approved the 
practice of blocking roads to oppose structural reform, asked for the liberation of 
jailed protesters, and demanded the retreat of gendarmes from Salta (Kohan 2002 
75). The Second National Piquetero Assembly took place in September 2001 and 
was quickly followed by The First National Assembly of Workers: Employed and 
Unemployed in February 2002. These assemblies highlighted the success accrued 
by piqueteros up to that moment and called for further mobilization.  In June 
2002, the Argentine newspaper La Nación reported that over 1,000 people from 
15 out of the country’s 23 provinces attended the piquetero assembly in session 
that month. By that time, the piquetero movement had achieved not only a large 
membership but also a degree of cohesion. Thus, in the second half of the 1990s 
and early 2000s, the country witnessed the emergence and consolidation of a new 
social actor. 
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Though privatizations, the growth of the informal sector, and other 
ramifications of neoliberalism contributed to the rise of piqueteros, their 
persistence and success may not be solely attributed to economic factors. After 
all, these conditions were present in other Latin American countries at the time, 
yet only Argentina witnessed the emergence of piqueteros. Rising 
unemployment and lack of policy benefits for the informal sector set up the stage 
for a protest movement but other elements also facilitated the strengthening of 
piqueteros. The federal nature of the state, calling for support networks 
throughout the country, as well as divisions within the Partido Justicialista 
provided important structural advantages to the movement (Ponce 2007, 7). 
Additionally, the tradition of strong sociopolitical organization established by 
labor provided an environment prone to the consolidation of such a group as 
well as the leadership and experience necessary to launch the movement, given 
that many of the initial piquetero organizers had previously been union 
organizers (Alcañiz and Scheier 2007, 160).  
The rise of piqueteros represented a historical déjà vu of sorts in 
Argentina. For the second time in the century, the lower urban class coalesced to 
channel its demands through mass protests. The social question, originally posed 
by the labor movement as it channeled the grievances of early industrial 
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workers, seemed to resurface in relation to the struggles of the unemployed. 
Unfortunately, the state’s initial response to this new social actor was not any 
better the second time around. Repression became the preferred policy, just as it 
had been in dealing with labor.  
The state violently confronted piqueteros from their emergence to their 
incorporation.  Teresa Fernandez, 25, a domestic servant and mother of two, 
became one of the first victims when she was shot in 1997 as gendarmerie and 
police officials forcibly dispersed a roadblock in Cultural-Co. From that point 
onwards, the gendarmerie would often be called on to suppress piqueteros. In 
1999, 500 gendarmes clashed with piqueteros blocking an interprovincial bridge 
joining Chaco and Corrientes; two piqueteros were killed by gunshot. In 2000, 
Aníbal Verón, a father of five, was shot in the face and killed in Salta as he 
protested against his former employer, who owned him 8 months of salary. In 
2002, violence reached the federal capital as police officers fatally shot two 
piqueteros in Buenos Aires during the ‚Avellaneda Massacre.‛ Alfredo Atanasof, 
Head of Cabinet at the time, qualified the relation between the government and 
piqueteros as a ‚kind of war.‛ (Sain 2006, 52).  
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The state’s war against piqueteros was not without temporary ceasefires. 
The state alternated between violence and minor concessions to quell the 
movement. From 1990 to 1996, the Menem administration increased 
unemployment benefits by 22 percent. However, because unemployment tripled 
during the same period, that gesture proved insufficient (Lodola 2005, 521). After 
the piquetero demonstrations of 1996 and 1997, the Ministry of Labor and Social 
Security implemented a more promising program: the Plan Trabajar (Plan to 
Work). Lasting until 2001, the plan benefitted about 20 percent of the 
unemployed population by providing monthly cash payments for community 
service. The clientelistic manner of resource management, whereby Peronist 
officials received more funds to distribute than did officials of the opposite party, 
UCR-Alianza, betrayed the plan’s ulterior motive of strengthening the Peronist 
party machine (Lodola 2005).  
President Fernando de la Rúa, elected in 1999, unsuccessfully tried to 
appease piqueteros by reforming the clientelistic aspect of the Plan Trabajar. 
Rather than distribute resources according to party loyalties or even regional 
unemployment levels, De la Rúa allocated money in proportion to the number of 
protests in a particular place. During his presidency, each piquetero protest was 
associated with an increase in 5,000 Argentine pesos for plans in the province 
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where it took place (Londola 2005, 529). Additionally, he tried to institutionalize 
the movement. In an attempt to channel piqueteros’ momentum, he encouraged 
them to organize as NGOs. Both initiatives failed to tame down piqueteros’ 
impetus. De la Rúa’s management of the Plan Trabajar program encouraged the 
groups to protest even more to secure more benefits. It reinforced piqueteros’ 
idea that social plans were not granted by the government but won and 
maintained through social struggle (Svampa and Pereyra 2009, 95). Likewise, De 
la Rúa’s push for piqueteros to form NGOs strengthened the groups’ ability to 
lobby for benefits while maintaining their propensity for conflict intact.  
After Menem’s and De la Rúa’s failed overtures to piqueteros, President 
Eduardo Duhalde, appointed in 2002, attempted more extensive action. In policy 
terms, this meant the implementation of the Plan Jefes y Jefas de Hogar (Heads of 
Household Plan) which remains in place to this day. The plan aims to promote 
work culture, improve employability, and access to the formal sector among its 
beneficiaries according to the Ministry of Labor and Social Security’s webpage. 
The program consists of cash transfers to families with children which are not 
receiving other types of government aid. Plan Jefes y Jefas consolidated several 
other social programs and extended coverage to more Argentineans than either 
Menem’s or De la Rua’s plans (CELS 2003; Svampa and Pereyra 2009, 101). In 
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this case, incorporation was truncated not by the end of the program, but that of 
Duhalde’s presidency in 2003.    
 Ultimately, the policies adopted by the Menem and De la Rúa 
administrations were short-term and small scale efforts that would not satisfy the 
piquetero movement’s demands. Duhalde took more significant steps to satisfy 
the unemployed in terms of benefits, but his 17 month long presidency did not 
allow enough time for a full-blown incorporation. Moreover, the larger context of 
broken promises and police brutality during the three presidents’ tenure negated 
their timid approaches to piqueteros. Nothing short of a comprehensive 
incorporation process could redefine piquetero-state relations.   
In the eyes of many piqueteros, the potential for such a process depended 
on the results of the 2003 presidential elections. Néstor Kirchner’s victory was 
welcomed by many piqueteros, mostly because the alternative would have been 
yet another Menem presidency along with his anti-labor policies and his promise 
to crack down on protesters (Schneider and Conti 2003, 16). Soon afterwards, 
Kirchner gave them better reason to celebrate.  
Kirchner approached the incorporation of the piqueteros by putting an 
end to their indiscriminate repression, legitimizing some groups and establishing 
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formal ties through appointments, meeting their demands with increased 
benefits, and using a carrot-and-stick method to reward supporters and punish 
opponents. He managed to reduce the number of protests and establish a 
symbiotic relationship in which he wields the state’s resources in the piqueteros’ 
favor as long as they wield their convening power to his advantage.  
Kirchner endeavored to curb state repression of piqueteros through three 
main policies. First, he forbade police officers from taking any weapons to 
protests, including guns and batons. Second, mutual agreements between 
piqueteros and the police were established so that as long as piquetero leaders 
keep the protest peaceful, the police may not break it up. Third, all police officers 
were required to wear fluorescent vests over their uniforms to make themselves 
easily identifiable and locatable to protesters (Mayekar 2006, 54). Watching over 
a roadblock in January 2014, a policeman commented: ‚before, we would have 
broken up the protest with tear gas to reestablish normal traffic, but for some 
time now, we have to just let them stand there in the middle of the street. We 
can’t do anything more than just watch them and make sure they are not getting 
violent.‛ Asked about the reason for this change in procedure, the officer 
responded: ‚the protesters were accusing us of using excessive force and some 
policemen even got in trouble some years ago when two piqueteros died in a 
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protest. That, and the fact that we live in a democratic country and everyone can 
protest what they want. But really, it comes down to orders from the higher-ups; 
someone changed their mind about how to deal with the piqueteros and we were 
instructed to leave them alone‛ (Interview 2014, Buenos Aires). Informally, these 
provisions served to decriminalize piquetero activity, a first step towards 
political inclusion.   
Another way Kirchner sought to incorporate piqueteros was through 
closer ties between the groups and government. For example, as newly elected 
president, he attended a piquetero rally in suburban Buenos Aires along with his 
Minister of Labor, Minister of Social Development, and secretary general of the 
presidency. There, the Kirchner administration received the piqueteros’ support 
and the piqueteros obtained the government’s symbolic blessing. This close 
relation was made much more official when Luis D’Elía, leader of Federación de 
Tierra y Vivienda (Federation for Land and Housing), one of the organizations 
that vowed its support to Kirchner, was appointed director of the 
Undersecretariat of Lands for Social Housing. The five groups in attendance at 
the rally, comprising 5 different organizations and representing a combined 
80,000 members, were among the so-called soft piqueteros (Shigetomi 151). 
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Because of their positive reception to the president’s gestures, these soft 
piqueteros were the first to be incorporated.  
Paradoxically, the division between soft piqueteros and hard piqueteros 
also contributed to Kirchner’s incorporation method. To supporters, Kirchner 
granted preferential treatment, especially in terms of access to resources. Soft 
piqueteros benefit from more social programs, such as the Plan Arraigo (Rooting 
Plan) and the Plan Manos a la Obra (Let’s Get to Work Plan), which support the 
building of housing and the financing of small businesses respectively (Svampa 
and Pereyra 2009, 213). Soft piquetero leaders themselves, such as Juan Carlos 
Alderete, acknowledge the government’s double standard in the distribution of 
social assistance (Shigetomi 152). Hard piqueteros have not fared so well. Given 
these groups’ reluctance to stop protesting, Kirchner responded not with carrots, 
but with sticks –the police was called on to prevent a hard piquetero group from 
entering the center of Buenos Aires in 2005, Raúl Castells, leader of an opposing 
group, was jailed numerous times between 2005 and 2006, social programs are 
denied, etc. (152). A member of Castells’ anti-Kirchner piqueteros lamented the 
treatment the group receives: ‚Because we do not support the government, we 
do not get benefits like the other groups do. [Kirchner and his administration] 
don’t give us as many social plans, they refuse to talk to us when we come 
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seeking dialogue, and they still treat us as criminals.‛ Through these tactics, 
Kirchner strengthened supporting groups, weakened opposing ones, and 
promoted internal divisions within the movement. The division within the 
piquetero movement along with the differential treatment each faction received 
furthered Kirchner’s incorporation strategy because they underscored the quid 
pro quo on which such incorporation was based.  
Quid pro quo, bargaining, or cooptation was a key feature of the Kirchner 
style of incorporation. The president stood to gain on two counts from piquetero 
incorporation: on the one hand, he would avoid the disruptive protests that 
jeopardized the country’s governability in the past; on the other, he could bolster 
his dominance within the PJ by harnessing the piqueteros’ masses and networks 
to his advantage. Kirchner succeeded on both. In terms of protests, the number of 
roadblocks decreased from 2336 in 2002 to 1278 in 2003 and remained at that 
lower level in following years (Nueva Mayoría). In terms of strengthening his 
position within the PJ, Kirchner relied on the piqueteros’ ability to coordinate 
locally and mobilize to achieve policy and electoral victories. For example, after 
he called for a national boycott of the Royal Dutch/Shell group, piqueteros 
blocked access to more than 30 gas stations, ultimately coercing the company to 
accept Kirchner’s terms (Reel). Likewise, Kirchner relied on piqueteros in the 
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2005 national parliamentary elections to campaign for his wife, Cristina 
Fernández de Kirchner. The Kirchner victory in these elections not only 
represented the advancement of Cristina’s career, but also the consolidation of 
Kirchner’s preponderance within Peronism after defeating Duhalde (Ponce 2007, 
15). The mutual compromise between Kirchner and piqueteros involved the 
exchange of benefits and improved treatment for political support and 
mobilization.  
A skillful politician, Kirchner used this relationship not only to advance 
his administration’s policy goals, but also his personal political ambitions. This 
suggests that the piqueteros’ loyalty (at least in the case of oficialista or soft 
piqueteros) lies with Kirchnerism rather than Peronism as a whole. Indeed, after 
Néstor’s death in 2010, Cristina inherited the piqueteros’ support and maintained 
the arrangement established by her late husband. This ‚marriage of 
convenience,‛ as it was called by the American embassy in Buenos Aires has 
gone through difficult times as the composition of the pro-Kirchner piquetero 
faction changes with the defection of some groups and the addition of others 
(Aznárez). Regardless, the system of incentives binding the piqueteros to 
Kirchnerism, within the framework established through institutionalization 
remains in place.  
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Change in Economic 
Model 
Emergence of 
New Social 
Actor 
Repression 
(and Failed 
Overtures) 
Incorporation 
and 
Cooptation 
Mirror-Image Historical Trajectories 
 The historical trajectories of the labor and piquetero movements exhibit 
remarkable similarities. Generally, the path of either group can be described in 
the following manner: a change in the economic model reshuffled class relations 
and gave rise to new economic and social conditions. As a result, a new social 
class emerged and organized to champion its interests. Given the novelty and 
perceived extremism in the movement’s methods, the state responded with 
repression, resulting in violent clashes. Timid overtures were attempted, but 
ultimately failed to establish a modus vivendi. Finally, the movement underwent 
incorporation thanks to the efforts of a personalistic leader seeking mass support 
to consolidate his position. Figure 2 depicts this model.  
  In the case of labor, the agro-export economic model was slowly 
supplanted by industrialization. As factories and manufacture gradually took 
hold in the country, social factors like immigration, urbanization, and poor 
working conditions gave rise to class-conscious labor force. As the working class 
organized, it staged protests and strikes to channel demands for better 
Figure 2  Historical Evolution of New Social Actors 
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conditions. In response, the government deported, jailed, and killed union 
leaders and members. President Yrigoyen briefly interceded in the unions’ favor, 
but quickly retreated and repression continued. In the end, labor was 
incorporated by Juan Domingo Perón, who stopped the persecution of union 
leaders, granted significant benefits to the working class, and established 
political ties through appointments and inclusion of labor in his Partido 
Justicialista. Perón benefitted from the incorporation of labor by harnessing their 
support for his political aims.  
 Piqueteros’ history is similar. In the 1990s, the switch from an import 
substitution model to neoliberalism led to high unemployment, the expansion of 
the informal sector, and the impoverishment of the lower classes. The 
unemployed masses, joined by other marginalized sectors of society, adopted the 
piquetero identity and protested by blocking roads, taking to the streets, etc. 
President Duhalde attempted to meet piqueteros’ demands through an updated 
social program, but the short length of his tenure and the sustained state 
repression thwarted his efforts. His successor, President Kirchner, fully 
incorporated piqueteros by ending repression by the police, extending benefits, 
and making strategic appointments. He relied on piqueteros’ ability to mobilize 
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to secure his political objectives. Table 1 summarizes the main developments in 
each stage of the movements’ history. 
The commonality in the pattern of emergence and incorporation between 
piqueteros and labor produces interesting insights. First, it suggests that 
piqueteros are deeply rooted in the social and historical conditions of Argentina, 
and are thus not an ephemeral movement. Rather, piqueteros came to occupy a 
social niche as important as that in which labor had long ago established itself. 
Likewise, the unemployed movement offered Kirchner a resource as 
indispensable as unions had offered Perón. Through this frame, many of the 
apparent contradictions posed by the persistence of piqueteros appear less 
unlikely. For instance, if labor unions did not disappear during 
deindustrialization, why should piqueteros run that fate after the improvement 
of economic conditions, as suggested by Ponce (2008) and Perez (2011)? As 
highlighted by their analogous histories, comparisons between labor and 
piqueteros are extremely pertinent. 
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Change in 
Economic Model 
Emergence of 
New Social 
Actor 
Repression 
Failed 
Overtures 
Incorporation 
and 
Cooptation 
Agro-Export 
 
Industrialization 
• Immigration 
• Urbanization 
• Poor working 
conditions 
Labor, which 
organized in 
unions and 
protested 
through 
strikes 
• 1902 
Residency Law 
• Many dead 
and injured in 
police clashes 
• Tragic Week 
of 1919 
• Argentine 
Patriotic 
League 
Yrigoyen 
interceded in 
unions’ favor, 
but quickly 
retreated 
Incorporation 
by Perón, 
exchanging 
benefits for 
mass support 
 
Import 
Substitution 
Industrialization 
 
Neoliberalism 
• Privatizations 
• Unemployment 
• Expanded 
informal sector 
The 
unemployed, 
which joined 
by other 
marginalized 
sectors, 
organized as 
piqueteros 
and protested 
through 
roadblocks 
• Killing of 
Teresa 
Rodríguez 
• Repurposing 
of Gendarmerie 
from border 
control to social 
repression 
• Avellaneda 
Massacre 
Duhalde 
extended 
benefits, but 
continued 
repression 
and his short 
presidency 
thwarted 
incorporation 
Incorporation 
by Kirchner, 
exchanging 
benefits for 
mass support 
 
Table 1 Stages in Labor and Piquetero Movements’ History                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                           
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FEATURES OF PIQUETERO MOVEMENT 
Roadblocks: A New Form of Protest 
 Piqueteros derive their name from the Spanish word ‚piquete,‛meaning a 
group of people who gather to protest, violently or peacefully. In Argentina, this 
protest has taken the particular form of roadblocks. This tactic is associated to 
piqueteros, gaining popularity concurrently with the rise of that new social actor 
in the mid-1990s. In recent times, however, it has become increasingly 
widespread, as even labor unions have come to employ it to express their 
discontent.   
 Roadblocks made a debut in Argentina in the province of Santa Fé in 1992 
when a local union restricted access to the factory by occupying the surrounding 
streets. The practice was repeated in the province of Santiago de Estero in 1993 
when people took to the street to protest the layoff of 10,000 state employees and 
the reduction in salary by 50% to the remaining workers (Schneider and Conti 
2003, 41). However, it was not until the events in Salta and Neuquén that 
roadblocks became an established form of social protest and the tactic of choice 
of the unemployed. 
 The reasons behind piqueteros’ adoption of roadblocks as their signature 
form of protest are varied. First, there is the logical inability to implement the 
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traditional mode of working class protest –strikes—given the protesters’ 
condition as unemployed. Because strikes involve the refusal to work in order to 
decrease or halt economic activity, having a job is a prerequisite. Deprived of this 
type of demonstration, piqueteros had to find a different viable avenue to 
express their grievances.  
Roadblocks were one such alternative. Because this technique was first 
used to impede access to factories, it served a purpose similar to that of strikes: to 
interrupt economic activity. In this case, even if production was taking place 
within the premises of the workplace, the output could not reach the market and 
be sold. As a piquetero leader remarked, ‚there was nothing else for *the first 
piqueteros] to do. Strikes were out of the question but it is what they knew how 
to do. So they found a way to still disrupt production but from the outside. The 
point [of roadblocks] was not to let anyone or anything come in or out of the 
factory.‛ Blocking national routes and bridges served the same purpose on a 
larger scale. Products originating in the provinces needed to reach Buenos Aires, 
the country’s economic hub, for both national consumption and export. By 
imposing roadblocks on national routes, piqueteros could suspend the supply 
chain of many industries, as well as deprive the capital of commodities to exert 
political pressure on the federal and provincial governments. Roadblocks were 
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the functional equivalent of strikes, with the necessary modifications to fit the 
condition of unemployed protesters. 
Though functionally similar, the legal status of these strikes and 
roadblocks is markedly different. While strikes are a constitutional right, 
imposing a roadblock is considered a crime punishable by imprisonment. The 
Constitution for the Argentine Nation guarantees the right of labor unions to 
strike in article 14bis: ‚Trade unions are hereby guaranteed: the right to enter 
into collective labor bargains; to resort to conciliation and arbitration; the right to 
strike.‛ In contrast, article 194 in the Argentine Penal Code states:  
He or she who, without creating a situation of public danger, impedes, 
obstructs, or hinders the normal functioning of transport by land, water or 
air, or the public services of communication, of water provision, of 
electricity or energetic substances, will be punished with a prison sentence 
ranging from three months to two years.2 
Operating within this legal framework proved difficult for piqueteros because it 
delegitimized their protests, reducing them to criminal acts. Prior to 
                                                          
2 My translation; original text: El que, sin crear una situación de peligro común, impidiere, 
estorbare o entorpeciere el normal funcionamiento de los transportes por tierra, agua o aire o los 
servicios públicos de comunicaciones, de provisión de agua, de electricidad o de sustancias 
energéticas, será reprimido con prisión de tres meses a dos años. 
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incorporation, article 194 provided the basis for the repression of piqueteros. Per 
Kirchner’s directives, law enforcement has turned a blind eye to roadblocks for 
the most part, but the article in question remains in effect. In 2003 an anti-
Kirchner senator unsuccessfully attempted to amend this article to provide for 
the creation of a commission that would pursue the peaceful resolution of 
roadblocks as an alternative to legal action. The failure to institutionalize 
piqueteros rights is consistent with Kirchner’s personalistic approach to 
piquetero incorporation: the movement’s rights are guaranteed not by law, but 
Kirchner himself (and by his wife after his death). 
 Outside the courts, roadblocks are not any more popular. In fact, an 
overwhelming majority of Argentineans disapprove of roadblocks as a form of 
protest. A survey conducted in May 2014 suggests that 4 out of 5 Buenos Aires 
residents disagree with the piqueteros’ practice (Lanusse 2014). As many as 64% 
of those interviewed reported that roadblocks affect their daily livelihood to a 
large or very large extent. These results are likely to be less pronounced in the 
provinces, where roadblocks are less frequent, but they are indicative of the high 
level of popular opposition to this particular method of protest.  
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 The general public’s opposition notwithstanding, roadblocks have become 
ubiquitous. Since the late 1990s, roadblocks have become the most common type 
of social protest in Argentina, surpassing even strikes (Figure 3). Though it is 
tempting to attribute this trend to the decline of labor unions and concurrent rise 
to prominence of the piqueteros, such assessment would be misleading. 
Roadblocks were pioneered by labor unions even if they were later popularized 
by piqueteros. Once the unemployed made roadblocks commonplace, workers 
readopted the practice. As Kozloff (2008) remarks, ‚psychologically, the country 
is now a ‘piquetero’ nation; for example, rather than carry out conventional 
strikes, workers now conduct pickets of their own and block roads‛ (174). Thus, 
though roadblocks are a technique mostly utilized by piqueteros, other sectors of 
civil society have also embraced the practice (Schuster et al. 2006 ). Just like 
traffic congestion or road maintenance, roadblocks are a permanent feature of 
Buenos Aires’ streets; so much so that the city has developed a website and 
mobile app that map out roads blocked by piqueteros to help commuters plan 
alternate routes. In short, the rise of the piqueteros has meant not just the entry of 
a new social actor to the Argentine political landscape, but also the introduction 
and popularization of a new form of social protest: roadblocks.  
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Figure 3 Number of Strikes vs. Roadblocks, 1989-2013 
Identity 
Embracing roadblocks as a modified form of protest was part of the newly 
unemployed workers’ evolving identities. As a matter of fact, analyzing identity 
and protest together helps solve two lingering questions in the literature about 
piqueteros: (i) why did piqueteros insist on a seemingly fruitless, high risk form 
of protest; and (ii) given the group’s heterogeneity and the recent decrease in 
class salience despite growing inequality, why did piqueteros develop a common 
identity at all? 
Roadblocks are a puzzling choice in terms of protest methods. Although 
this type of demonstration served a similar purpose to strikes and was a feasible 
alternative for the unemployed, the costs of participation seemed to outweigh the 
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benefits for most of the pre-incorporation period. Protesters who engaged in 
roadblocks were subject to violence at the hands of gendarmerie and the police 
until Kirchner’s ascent to power. Moreover, only under De la Rúa’s presidency 
was there a clear cause-and-effect relation between roadblocks and increased 
access to material benefits in the form of social plans. The rational actor model 
would not seem to account for this form of collective action given the substantial 
costs and minimal material benefits associated.  
Material benefits, however, are not the only incentive to engage in 
political participation. As Rosenstone and Hansen explain, 
Those who are active in politics can also receive solidary benefits, intangible 
rewards that stem from social interaction, like status, deference, and 
friendship. And participation can also yield purposive benefits, intrinsic 
rewards that derive from the act of participation itself, such as a sense of 
satisfaction from having contributed to a worthy cause (16). 
Piqueteros received social benefits as they learned about the effects of structural 
reform on their peers, warned each other of the approaching gendarmes, and 
formed personal relationships while holding roadblocks. They also received 
purposive benefits because they valued their participation in roadblocks as 
efforts to right a wrong. For example, early piqueteros in Neuquén demanded to 
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be granted rights to exploit El Mangrullo gas field on the grounds of historical 
reparation rather than poverty alleviation (Svampa and Pereyra 2009, 117). 
Hence, despite the low likelihood of roadblocks to result in increased material 
benefits, participants were rewarded in different ways that incentivized 
collective action.  
 But are these rewards substantive enough to offset the high costs of 
roadblocks, ascending in some cases to physical injury or loss of life? As it turns 
out, that might not be necessary. Though threats to one’s physical integrity are 
usually construed as obstacles to collective action, in some cases, they may 
actually incentivize it. ‚Contrary to sociological and commonsensical 
expectations< the onset of severe state repression, that increases dramatically 
both the potential risks and costs of collective action, may itself stimulate certain 
types of social movements‛ (Loveman 1998, 516). In the case of piqueteros, this 
paradoxical process is more clearly exemplified by analyzing the role of martyrs. 
For instance, the killing of Teresa Rodríguez in Neuquén had a profound effect 
on the movement. The young mother came to symbolize the struggle of an 
unwavering people and her name became a rallying cry in later protests 
(Schneider and Conti 2003, 25). Likewise, some movements bear the names of 
piqueteros killed in protest, as is the case of Coordinadora de Trabajadores 
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Desocupados Aníbal Verón. As explained by a piquetero leader, ‚*the 
authorities] thought we would retreat if they killed a few of us, that we would 
take it as a lesson. But it only made us want to protest more because we started 
protesting not only for our original demands but also for those who had been 
killed or abused. We wanted to reassert ourselves and show that we would not 
be intimidated, that they would have to deal with us because we would not go 
away,‛ The killing of piqueteros did not discourage further protests but rather 
fueled the movement by providing them with yet another grievance to organize 
around.      
  Concurrently, the types of benefits obtained from roadblocks and the 
risks involved contributed to the formation of a piquetero identity. The physical 
proximity associated with solidary benefits and the shared threat of state 
repression have been identified as unit-forming factors which lead people to 
identify as members of a group (Tajfel 27). Their mode of protest, then, is an 
integral part of piqueteros’ self-conceptualization as a group. In fact, the 
definition of the word piquetero itself refers to people who picket or perform a 
blockade, meaning that the movement derives its name from the type of protest 
in which it engages: roadblocks. During the period of piqueteros’ identity 
formation, roadblocks were cathartic experiences that provided a communal 
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space for people to voice their complaints, collaborate towards a common 
objective, and find a new identity (Svampa and Pereyra 2009, 111). Roadblocks 
provided non-material benefits and physical proximity and also reversed the role 
of repression from a cost to an incentive, providing members with a shared 
threat and making for a very favorable recipe for identity formation.   
 However, these elements do not exhaust all explanations for piquetero 
identity. Heterogeneity and the decrease of class salience are often cited as 
formidable hindrances to piquetero identity formation. Given that similarity 
among members is another important condition for group identity, people with 
such varied backgrounds as piqueteros are not likely to identify with each other 
(Turner 1982, 27). What similarity is there between an informal sector worker, 
such as a nanny or a street vendor, and a laid off bureaucrat? Or between a 
retired man and a young girl who has never been able to find a job? Roberts 
(2002) succinctly summarizes this argument as follows: 
The dispersion and segmentation of the labor market [product of the 
transition from ISI to neoliberalism], both functionally and legally, make it 
increasingly difficult to identify a harmony of interest between formal, 
informal, temporary contract, and non-contract employees. There is wide 
variation in the wages, work conditions, job security, social benefits, and 
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relations with capital across these different categories of workers, and 
little to provide a sense of collective identity (22). 
The solution to this dilemma lies in the early history of piqueteros. Though today 
the movement expands throughout the Argentine geography and society, it 
emerged in fairly homogenous contexts. For example, participants in the first 
piquetero uprisings in Salta and Neuquén were all former YPF workers, with 
similar socioeconomic status and even line of work. Thus, although piqueteros as 
a whole are a varied group, locally (where identity forming events take place) 
they were fairly similar amongst themselves. Likewise, different social groups 
were absorbed at different stages in the different piquetero organizations. As 
remarked by a member of the Movimiento Independiente de Jubilados y Desocupados 
(Independent Movement of Retirees and Unemployed), ‚we started out working 
only with retirees, fighting for their pensions, for better conditions. The 
unemployed came later and so we started working with both groups.‛ Rather 
than consolidate a common identity for all demographics from the start, many 
groups were formed by a homogenous base that diversified as time went by. 
Heterogeneity presents a problem when looking at the current state of the 
movement, but a chronological perspective reveals the formation of piquetero 
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identity took place in local, homogeneous settings where single demographic 
sectors coalesced.  
 Shifting the focus from group to individual level analysis reveals 
interesting insight about piqueteros’ conceptualization of themselves within the 
movement. The popular nomenclature, piqueteros, is somewhat contested by 
members perceptive to the disdain that usually accompanies the word. 
Expressing his reservations on being called piquetero, the leader of an 
unemployed group remarked, ‚people call us piqueteros because that is what 
they see us do –picketing, blocking roads. They give us that name disparagingly 
because it bothers them that we protest that way. But that is not all we do –we 
have soup kitchens, we do community work—the roadblocks are just a small 
part of our activities so I find the name reductive. At first I was more opposed to 
it and tried to rebrand [our group] but the name had already stuck so I think the 
task now is to give it a more positive connotation‛ (Interview 2014, Buenos 
Aires). Others do not share that concern and find the name empowering. Being 
jobless or unemployed seems passive and shameful; being a piquetero implies 
taking action and working towards a goal (Svampa and Pereyra 2009, 137). 
Hence, the pride some piqueteros derive from that identity, incomprehensible as 
it may be from other perspectives (Schneider and Conti 2003, 19).  
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 Another commonly misunderstood link is that between the identity of 
piqueteros and that of workers. Workers and the unemployed seem, by 
definition, diametrical opposites and as such, these identities are thought to be 
mutually exclusive. However, the boundaries of these identities are much more 
porous and flexible than would appear at first. Firstly, because piqueteros also 
represent those in the informal sector, workers (albeit non-traditional ones) have 
always been part of the movement. Secondly, the flexible labor market created by 
structural reform results in people repeatedly transitioning from employment to 
unemployment. As a result, self-identified workers often find themselves 
temporarily without a job and their experience expands the worker identity. 
Thirdly, because the pioneer piqueteros were lifetime workers, through their 
leadership they infused the piquetero movement with a work culture that further 
bridges the two identities (Svampa and Pereyra 2009, 138). Lastly, piquetero 
recipients of social plans that include a work component or members of groups 
that have formed cooperatives also have legitimate reasons to identify as 
workers in addition to being piqueteros. Consequently, there exists great overlap 
between these two apparently antagonistic identities.  
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Distributive Politics: Programmatic or Clientelistic 
 An ongoing controversy in the literature on piqueteros pertains to the 
types of linkages between the movement and the PJ during the administration of 
either Kirchner. Distinguishing between programmatic and clientelistic modes of 
benefit distribution is useful in tackling this question. Moreover, a closer look at 
the benefits exchanged between the piqueteros and the Kirchners illuminates the 
groups’ role within Peronism. 
 Broadly, programmatic linkages involve support for a party based on a 
match between citizens’ preferences and the party’s proposed policies (Stokes et 
al. 2013, Kitschelt and Wang 2014). Upon victory, the programmatic party should 
enact its promised policies and any goods derived are to be collectively enjoyed 
by party supporters and detractors alike. Contrastingly, in clientelist linkages the 
party directly distributes material benefits in exchange for votes, or more 
indirectly, grants favors to activists who harness electoral support for the party 
(Stokes et al., Levitsky 2003, 8). The distribution of goods is narrowly targeted to 
benefit only supporters in accordance with a quid-pro-quo arrangement.  
In the context of Argentina, Peronism replaced programmatic linkages 
with clientelist ones (Levitsky 2003). Based on the PJ’s traditional linkage with 
labor, its main constituency, workers could expect their ideological affinity with 
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party elites to result in a favorable redistribution of benefits through labor-
friendly policies. However, the onset of neoliberalism reduced both the ability of 
the party to espouse more universal redistributive policies and of the unions to 
rally lower-class support. Clientelistic linkages emerged as a viable alternative 
for the party to maintain electoral success under the new economic model. The 
PJ’s weak institutionalization of programmatic linkages allowed for this 
transition to machine politics.  
The prevalence of machine politics in Argentina is not contested and has 
been widely documented (Calvo and Murillo 2013; Weitz-Shapiro 2014). 
However, parties often employ a mix of programmatic and clientelistic 
distribution of benefits depending on the constituency, creating complex linkage 
structures. Thus, even though the PJ became generally more clientelistic as a 
result of market reforms, it is theoretically possible to find programmatic 
relations with certain sectors. Analyzing the nature of the PJ’s linkage with 
piqueteros helps assess the continuities or discontinuities surrounding the critical 
juncture of market reforms and piqueteros role in this transformation.  
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Etchemendy and Garay (2011) make a case for a more programmatic 
linkage between piqueteros (and the lower class in general) and the Kirchners, 
even if the PJ itself functions as a machine.  
Regulatory policy< is the area in which *the Kirchner governments+ 
rewarded popular constituencies more directly. By regulatory policy we 
mean three general initiatives: (1) price controls and export taxes and 
quotas on wage goods (basically, gasoline, milk, and beef) and the main 
food crops, (2) price controls in public utilities, and (3) subsidies to 
businessmen (and therefore to consumption) in areas such as energy, 
transport and food production (291). 
These initiatives represent programmatic distribution because the benefits 
derived were enjoyed by all members of the popular class whether or not they 
supported the Kirchners. Additionally, the Kirchners nationalized the pension 
plan and extended coverage until it was virtually universal (297). Again, the 
programmatic nature of approaches to the popular sectors, including piqueteros 
is evidenced by the fact that access to coverage was independent of vote 
commitment. And, though for the most part the authors discard clientelistic 
relations, they do acknowledge the reliance on patronage, noting that ‚by 2006 at 
least 50 members of various unemployed organizations, including their main 
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leaders, held positions in the state‛ (287). Generally, a programmatic linkage 
between the Kirchners and piqueteros would be consistent with the rhetoric 
adopted by the movement during its origins, including criticism of the Peronist 
clientelistic network (Svampa and Pereyra 2009, 221).  
Unfortunately, despite programmatic distribution of some benefits by the 
Kirchner administrations and piqueteros own criticism of clientelistic practices, 
the movement succumbed to the PJ’s political machine. The cooption strategy of 
incorporation employed by the Kirchners and the internal organization of 
piquetero groups contributed to a clientelistic linkage.  
For the Kirchners, the cooption of piqueteros was not just aimed at 
curbing protests to achieve governability, but to extend their dominance within 
Peronism. The Kirchners took advantage of the institutional flexibility of the PJ to 
incorporate piqueteros and establish quid-pro-quo relationships involving the 
targeted distribution of benefits in exchange for support (Mayekar 2006, 63). 
Politically, the cooption of the piqueteros was an instrument used by Néstor 
Kirchner to accumulate more power than his rival within the PJ, Duhalde. 
Accordingly, he sought to establish a network of local support relying on 
piquetero organizations and the availability of massive resources for social 
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assistance. Framing the clientelistic relation between the Kirchners and 
piqueteros in terms of supply and demand, as Ponce (2007) does, Kirchner’s 
rivalry with Duhalde provided the demand for a clientelistic network. 
On the other hand, the piqueteros’ organizational structure was 
particularly well adapted to supply for machine politics. After market reforms, 
piquetero groups were more representative of the popular classes due to the 
growth of the informal sector and the decline in political power of the labor 
unions. Moreover, piquetero leaders had the ability to mobilize large masses in 
the same way a party broker or local boss would, which hinted at their potential 
to deliver votes or stage rallies in support of Kirchner and his policies. The 
selective incentives built into the groups’ organization further facilitated a 
clientelistic exchange. To overcome the collective action problem, piquetero 
leaders only rewarded with food, money, and social plans those members who 
participated in the group’s activities. As discussed earlier, non-material benefits 
drew people to the piquetero movement in general, but selective material 
incentives came to determine which specific groups they would join within the 
movement. Provided with the resources to distribute selectively to active 
members, piquetero leaders could strengthen their group by attracting more 
followers and promoting greater engagement and participation. Because access 
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to benefits secured by the group was already conditional, making votes or rally 
participation a requirement for the receipt of money, food, and social plans was 
consistent with established practice. These leaders commanded resources 
valuable to Kirchner and they were willing to trade them in exchange for 
patronage and favors to expand their own power.  
 The following dynamic, observed at a piquetero group meeting, helps 
clarify the workings of the clientelistic linkage to the Kirchner administrations. 
At the meeting, the leader of the oficialista group reminded members of the 
importance of their participation in forthcoming pro-government 
demonstrations. In his explanation, the connection between providing support to 
the government through rallies and receiving benefits was made explicit: ‚As 
you all know, there is another round of marches approaching. As I always say to 
you, it is very important that we all participate in these demonstrations because 
that is what guarantees the things we have achieved so far. We have never been 
handed *social+ plans, we have always had to work for them< Now that we get 
along [with the government] we must show that we can cooperate so that later 
when we ask for increases [in funds for plans] they listen to us. But if we do not 
show up to the demonstrations there are dozens of other groups who would be 
happy to take our place and [the administration] would see that we are not able 
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to hold our end of the bargain, that we are not good partners< The march 
organizer will be taking attendance before we depart because it is not fair that 
only some of us are fighting for the cause while others just show up to the 
meetings and to collect the benefits at the end of the month.‛ This excerpt from 
the speech highlights the conditionality benefits: if a member does not actively 
contribute to the group, they will jeopardize their welfare assistance. Moreover, 
it presents the logic of the demonstration: if the group supports the government, 
the government will reward the group. Lastly, it also hints at the competition 
between piquetero groups by pointing to the fact that the government could 
receive support from other groups, in which case those groups would be favored 
in the distribution of benefits.  
Relations between Labor and Piquetero Movements 
 On the topic of competition, it is important to assess the relation between 
the labor and piquetero movements. Are the two movements in antagonistic 
terms, or do they mostly cooperate? While the literature largely addresses each 
social actor’s relation with the state, relations between the two movements have 
been academically neglected.  
 Labor unions and piquetero groups seem positioned for conflict. They 
cohabit in the lower strata of Argentine society. They represent overlapping 
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constituencies and exhibit similar dependence on the state in terms of political 
status and access to resources. Both movements operate in the sphere of social 
protest to advance different aims. It was the retreat of labor, their inability to 
absorb the unemployed, and the demotion of unions within the PJ that created 
the space and opportunity for piqueteros’ emergence. This dynamic suggests 
plenty of friction and competition in a zero-sum environment where each 
movement stands to gain from the other’s loss in membership, political 
relevance, effectiveness in protest, etc. However, the relation between the two 
movements is more complex than a simple rivalry. 
 The experience of piquetero groups and labor unions within the Central de 
Trabajadores de la Argentina (CTA; Argentine Workers Central Union) is 
representative of the interactions between the movements in general. The CTA is 
an umbrella organization that encompasses several groups, including pro-
Kirchner piqueteros and labor unions, groups of squatters, and retiree groups 
among others. With respect to her organization’s role in bringing together such 
diverse sectors of society, a CTA secretary commented: ‚this is what is great 
about the CTA –that we represent the many movements operating within the 
popular classes and we can coordinate and formulate a coherent strategy for our 
social struggle. The truth is that many of the problems that the individual groups 
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within the CTA seek to address are highly interrelated. For example, the issue of 
housing and living conditions for those in the villas [shantytowns] is connected to 
the issue of unemployment, which is connected to the issue of the precarious 
labor market, which also affects workers in the formal sector. The people 
experience all these difficulties. There are groups that deal with each of these 
problems separately and they are performing a very important task, but here at 
the CTA we can take a more holistic approach and consider the bigger picture.‛ 
In practice, this means that the CTA coordinates joint protests attended by 
diverse groups, employs resources on behalf of piqueteros’ and union’s (and 
other groups’) interests, and negotiates common positions between them. A 
piquetero leader weighed in on the topic: ‚it is easier to cooperate with labor 
unions under the auspices of the CTA, although we also have good relations 
with unions outside the Central. In terms of logistics, if we are going to stage a 
protest, for example, it is easier to organize with the different groups from the 
CTA because we are within the same hierarchy so one person can take the lead 
and organize who’s going to be positioned where and what message is going to 
be on the banners and so on< This doesn’t mean that there are not tensions 
sometimes. When trying to set the agenda for the CTA, deciding which points to 
emphasize, what demands to push forward, the unemployed groups and labor 
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unions often fail to see eye to eye. We each are trying to steer the CTA in 
opposite directions< well, not necessarily opposite, just different priorities. They 
want better wages and Christmas bonuses and we are not against that, but most 
of our people are either unemployed or working in cooperatives so those things 
do not apply. We are focused on fighting for genuine jobs and securing 
assistance to maintain a minimum living standard meanwhile.‛ As a microcosm 
for popular social movements, the CTA shows that collaboration between 
piqueteros and labor is possible and even disagreements about priorities can be 
negotiated internally.  
 The main division, then, is not between piqueteros and labor, but rather 
between hard and soft piqueteros. Piquetero groups with differing positions 
regarding the Kirchners are less likely to cooperate among themselves than are 
piquetero groups and labor unions who share a common position on the 
Kirchners. As explained by the pro-Kirchner piquetero leader from the CTA, 
‚those radical or so-called hard [groups] have a very different philosophy. They 
stuck to more extreme and defiant methods; we found more efficient methods to 
channel our demands and it has worked for us. But they have their own unions 
they are allied to as well< Everyone is entitled to their political views; that is not 
the problem. We do not agree with the president 100% either, but we believe we 
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can achieve more working within the system than against it.‛ In short, the 
divisions within the piquetero movement along the lines of pro- or anti-Kirchner 
positions are greater than the differences of the movement as a whole in relation 
to organized labor.  
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CONCLUSION 
 A theoretically grounded understanding of piqueteros helps dispel many 
of the academic mysteries surrounding the movement. First, a review of the 
origins of labor and piqueteros revealed adherence to historical patterns 
underpinning the early trajectories of the movements. Both emerged in close 
relation to profound systematic changes in the country, organized and 
represented the salient popular class of the time, and assumed similar political 
roles. In light of this analysis, organized labor emerges not as a disconnected 
movement, but rather as point of reference for future studies of the piqueteros.  
 Secondly, a reevaluation of the literature on the intrinsic features of 
piqueteros, enriched by primary data deriving from observations and interviews 
yields important contributions to some of the most debated aspects of the 
movement.  
The logic of roadblocks, not so much contested as neglected by the 
literature, is illuminated through a finer understanding of the constraints and 
incentives under which members operate. The legacy of labor unions’ strikes 
molded the search for a new viable form of protest that would maintain the same 
functional purpose of interrupting economic activity. Additionally, non-material 
benefits acquire primordial importance as the main motivators in the highly 
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principled and highly social practice of collective participation in roadblocks. 
The data also suggests that state repression motivated further organization, 
counterintuitive as it may seem. Yet again, the convergence of labor unions and 
piqueteros is illustrated by their common use of roadblocks as a protest 
technique in recent times.  
The consolidation of a piquetero identity is another process that becomes 
more comprehensible thanks to the intellectual moves undertaken in this paper. 
Piquetero identity appears to be associated to the cathartic experience of 
roadblocks and the interplay of identity-forming elements at a very local scale 
where heterogeneity did not present as a problem. In terms of identity, too, the 
ties to labor become relevant, given that the self-conceptualizations as piquetero 
and as worker are compatible and overlapping.  
The linkages between piqueteros and the PJ were assessed to establish a 
case for either programmatic or clientelistic ties. Though some of the benefits 
distributed by the PJ were programmatic in nature, most were found to be 
exclusive and conditional, consistent with clientelistic practices. The constraints 
of the neoliberal age, along with the mutual need of Kirchner and piquetero 
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leaders to exchange resources to consolidate their power contributed to this type 
of relation between the party and the movement.  
Lastly, the relation between piqueteros and labor was examined. Contrary 
to reasonable expectations for a competitive, antagonistic relation, unions and 
piqueteros were shown to collaborate and relate most prominently through 
shared support or opposition of the Kirchners.  
The contributions of this paper notwithstanding, piqueteros remain a ripe 
topic for research. Piqueteros’ status as informally incorporated clientelistic 
partners to the PJ may be jeopardized once Cristina abandons the Casa Rosada 
after the elections of 2015. At that point not only will piqueteros likely have to 
renegotiate with the incoming president, but perhaps also among themselves to 
bridge the hard/soft divide and present a more united front. Socially, the possible 
emergence of indigenous people as a more assertive actor, especially in matters 
of land rights, will provide piqueteros with the opportunity to expand their 
ranks.  However, it will also pose the challenge of redefining their identity and 
message to become more inclusive. But just like piqueteros, researchers will also 
be faced with numerous challenges and opportunities. Only through sustained 
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academic attention and theory-rich data interpretations will we achieve an 
expansive understanding of the future of piqueteros.  
  
70 
 
 
WORKS CITED 
Alberdi, Juan Bautista. 2003.   ses    u tos e   rti     r     r   i   i   
 o  ti   e     ep   i   r e ti  . 1.st ed. Córdoba, Argentina: El Cid 
Editor. 
Alcañiz, Isabella, and Melissa Scheier. 2007. "New Social Movements with Old 
Party Politics: The MTL Piqueteros and the Communist Party in 
Argentina." Latin American Perspectives 34, no. 153: 157-71. 
Alderman, Jeremy. 1992. "Reflections on Argentine Labour and the Rise of 
Perón." Bulletin of Latin American Research 11, no. 3: 243-59. 
Baer, Werner. 1991. "Social Aspects of Latin American Inflation." In Latin America: 
The Crisis of the Eighties and the Opportunities of the Nineties, edited by 
Werner Baer, Joseph Petry, and Murray Simpson. Champaign, Ill.: Bureau 
of Economic and Business Research, College of Commerce and Business 
Administration, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign. 
Benclowicz, Jose. 2010. "Continuities, Scope, and Limitations of the Argentine 
Piquetero Movement: The Cases of Tartagal and Mosconi." Latin American 
Perspectives 38, no. 1: 74-87. 
Boas, Taylor C., and Jordan Gans-Morse. 2009. "Neoliberalism: From New 
Liberal Philosophy To Anti-Liberal Slogan." Studies in Comparative 
International Development 44: 137-61. 
Calvo, Ernesto, and Maria Murillo. 2013. "When Parties Meet Voters: Assessing 
Political Linkages Through Partisan Networks and Distributive 
Expectations in Argentina and Chile." Comparative Political Studies 46, no. 
7: 851-82. 
CELS. 2003. Plan Jefas y Jefes. Buenos Aires: CELS.  
Código Penal de la Nación Argentina. Chapter 2, article 194. 
Collier, Ruth Berins, and David Collier. 1991. Shaping the Political Arena: Critical 
Junctures, the Labor Movement, and Regime Dynamics in Latin America. 
Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press. 
Constitución de la Nación Argentina. Chapter 1, section 14bis.  
71 
 
 
Corradi, Juan E. 1985. The Fitful Republic: Economy, Society, and Politics in 
Argentina. Boulder: Westview Press. 
Drake, Paul W. 1996. Labor Movements and Dictatorships: The Southern Cone in 
Comparative Perspective. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press. 
Edwards, Sebastian. 1995. Crisis and Reform in Latin America: From Despair to 
Hope. New York: Oxford University Press. Ch. 3: ‚The Emergence of a 
New Latin American Consensus.‛ 
Epstein, Edward. 2009. "Perpetuating Social Movements amid Declining 
Opportunity: The Survival Strategies of Two Argentine Piquetero 
Groups." European Review of Latin American and Caribbean Studies 86: 3-19. 
Etchemendy, Sebastian and Candelaria Garay. 2011. "Argentina: Left Populism in 
Comparative Perspective, 2003-2009." In The Resurgence of the Latin 
American Left, edited by Steven Levitsky and Kenneth Roberts, 283-305. 
Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press. 
Evans-Klock, Christine, Peter Richards, and Corinne Vargha. 1998. Worker 
Displacement: Public Policy and Labour-management Initiatives in Selected 
OECD Countries. Geneva: Employment and Training Dept., International 
Labour Office. 
Interview with anti-Kirchner piquetero, January 7, 2014. 
Interview with Buenos Aires police officer, January 7, 2014. 
Interview with pro-Kirchner CTA piquetero leader, January 4, 2014.  
Kenworthy, Eldon. 1972. "Argentina: The Politics of Late Industrialization." 
Foreign Affairs 12, no. 47: 451-76. 
Kitschelt, Herbert, and Yi-ting Wang. 2014. "Programmatic Parties and Party 
Systems: Opportunities and Constraints." In Politics Meets Policies: The 
Emergence of Programmatic Political Parties, edited by Juan Pablo Luna. 
Stockholm, Sweden: International Institute for Democracy and Electoral 
Assistance. 
72 
 
 
Kohan, Anibal. 2002. A Las Calles!: Una Historia De Los Movimientos Piqueteros Y 
Caceroleros De Los '90 Al 2002. 1.st ed. Buenos Aires: Colihue. 
Kozloff, Nikolas. 2008. Revolution!: South America and the Rise of the New Left. New 
York: Palgrave Macmillan. 
La Nacion. 2002. "Se Realizó La Primera Jornada De La Asamblea Nacional 
Piquetera." June 22, 2002. http://www.lanacion.com.ar/407685-se-realizo-
la-primera-jornada-de-la-asamblea-nacional-piquetera. 
Lanusse, Tomas. 2014. ‚Encuesta de Diagnóstico Político: ¿Qué opinan los 
porteños sobre los piquetes?‛ Diagnóstico Político. Buenos Aires.  
Levitsky, Steven. 2003. "From Labor Politics To Machine Politics: The 
Transformation Of Party-Union Linkages In Argentine Peronism, 1983-
1999." Latin American Research Review 38, no. 3: 3-36. 
Levitsky, Steven. 2003. Transforming Labor-based Parties in Latin America: Argentine 
Peronism in Comparative Perspective. Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge 
University Press. 
Lodola, German. 2005. ‚Protesta Popular y Redes Clientelares en la Argentina.‛ 
Desarrollo Económico 44, no. 146. 515-536.  
Loveman, Mara. "High‐Risk Collective Action: Defending Human Rights In 
Chile, Uruguay, And Argentina." American Journal of Sociology 104, no. 2 
(1998): 477-525. 
Mainwaring, Scott, and Timothy R. Scully. 1995. ‚Introduction: Party Systems in 
Latin America.‛ In Scott Mainwaring and Timothy R. Scully, eds., 
Building Democratic Institutions: Party Systems in Latin America. 
Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. 
Manzetti, Luigi. 2009. Neoliberalism, Accountability, and Reform Failures in Emerging 
Markets: Eastern Europe, Russia, Argentina, and Chile in Comparative 
Perspective. University Park, Pa.: Pennsylvania State University Press. 
Mayekar, Samir. 2006. ‚The Piquetero Effect: Examining the Argentine 
Government’s Response to the Piquetero Movement.‛ Master’s thesis, 
Northwestern University. 
73 
 
 
http://www.polisci.northwestern.edu/documents/undergraduate/samir-
mayekar.pdf 
McGuire, James W. 1997.  ero is   it out  er     io s    rties      e o r    i  
Argentina. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press. 
McGuire, James. 1995. "Political Parties and Democracy in Argentina." In Building 
Democratic Institutions: Party Systems in Latin America, edited by Scott 
Mainwaring and Timothy Scully, 200-246. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford 
University Press. 
Medina, Paula. 1997. "Thoughts on the Visual Aspect of the Neoliberal Order and 
the Piquetero Movement in Argentina." Latin American Perspectives 38, no. 
1: 88-101. 
Novick, Marta, Miguel Lengyel, and Marianela Sarabia. 2009. "From Social 
Protection to Vulnerability: Argentina's Neo-liberal Reforms of the 1990s." 
International Labour Review 148, no. 3: 235-52. 
Nueva Mayoría. 2013. ‚Indicadores de conflictividad social (1980-2012).‛ Buenos 
Aires. 
Nueva Mayoría. 2014. ‚Indicadores de conflictividad durante el 2013.‛ Buenos 
Aires.  
Panettieri, Jose. 1983.  r   e es    rote  i      ustri        -1930. Buenos Aires: 
Centro Editor De América Latina. 
Peralta-Ramos, Monica. 1992. The Political Economy of Argentina: Power and Class 
since 1930. Boulder: Westview Press. 
Perez, Marcos. 2011. ‚Grievances Matter: Unemployment and the decline of the 
piquetero movement (2003-2007).‛ Master’s thesis.The University of 
Texas at Austin. 
Pion-Berlin, David. 1989. The Ideology of State Terror: Economic Doctrine and 
Political Repression in Argentina and Peru. Boulder, Colo.: L. Rienner 
Publishers. 
74 
 
 
Ponce, Aldo. 2007. "Unemployment and Clientelism: The Piquetero Movement." 
Journal of Interdisciplinary and Multidisciplinary Research 1, no. 2. 
Ponce, Aldo. 2008. "Emergence, Organizational Transformations, and Decline of 
the Piquetero Movement: a Comparative Institutional Explanation." 
University Library of Munich, MRPA Paper No 8748, Online at 
http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/8748/. 
Portes, Alejandro, and Kelly Hoffman. "Latin American Class Structures: Their 
Composition And Change During The Neoliberal Era." Latin American 
Research Review 38, no. 1 (2003): 41-82. 
Randall, Laura. 1978. An Economic History of Argentina in the Twentieth Century. 
New York: Columbia University Press. 
Roberts, Kenneth M. 2002. ‚Social Inequalities without Class Cleavages in Latin 
America’s Neoliberal Era.‛ Studies in Comparative International 
Development 36, 4: 3–33. 
Rocchi, Fernando. 2006. Chimneys in the Desert Industrialization in Argentina during 
the Export Boom Years, 1870-1930. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University 
Press. 
Rojas, Rene. 2014. "The Buenos Aires Subway Strike: A Window on Post-Collapse 
Labor Politics." NACLA Report on the Americas 47 (1): 14-19.  
Sain, Marcelo. 2006. "Police, Politics, and Society in the Province of Buenos 
Aires." In Broken Promises? the Argentine Crisis and Argentine Democracy, 
edited by Edward Epstein and David Pion-Berlin. Lanham: Lexington 
Books. 
Schneider, Ivan, and Rodrigo Conti. 2003.  iqueteros     ir    ist ri  . 
Buenos Aires: Astralib. 
Shuster, Federico, Germán Pérez, Sebastián Pereyra,Melchor Armesto, Martín 
Armelino, Analía García, Ana Natalucci, Melina Vázquez, and Patricia 
Zipcioglu. 2006. ‚Transformaciones de la protesta social en Argentina 
1989-2003.‛ Working paper 48. Instituto de Investigaciones Gino 
Germani, Facultad de Ciencias Sociales, Universidad de Buenos Aires.  
75 
 
 
Stokes, Susan Carol, Thad Dunning, Marcelo Nazareno, and Valeria Brusco. 
2013. Brokers, Voters, and Clientelism: The Puzzle of Distributive Politics. New 
York: Cambridge University Press. 
Svampa, Maristella, and Sebastia Pereyra. 2009. Entre La Ruta Y El Barrio: La 
Experiencia De Las Organizaciones Piqueteras. 3rd ed. Buenos Aires: 
Editorial Biblos. 
Thomas, Jim. 2002. Decent Work in the Informal Sector: Latin America. Working 
paper. Geneva: International Labor Office. 
Turner, John. 1982."Towards a Cognitive Redefinition of the Social Group." In 
Social Identity and Intergroup Relations, edited by Henri Tajfel, 15-40. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Villanueva, Javier. 1972. "El Origen De La Industrialización Argentina." Desarrollo 
Económico 12, no. 47: 451-76. 
Weitz-Shapiro, Rebecca. 2014. Curbing Clientelism in Argentina: Politics, Poverty, 
and Social Policy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Welch, Dick, and Olivier Mond. 1998. The Case-by-case Approach to Privatization 
Techniques and Examples. Washington, D.C.: World Bank. 
Williamson, John. 1990. ‚What Washington Means by Policy Reform.‛ In John 
Williamson, ed., Latin American Adjustment: How Much Has 
Happened? Washington, DC: Institute for International Economics. 
 
